



# **DNS Security**

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# DNS Known Concepts

- Known DNS concepts:
  - Delegation, Referral, Zone, RRs, label, RDATA, Authoritative server, caching forwarder, resolver, SOA parameters

# Why DNSSEC

- Good security is multi-layered and preventive
  - Multiple defense barriers in physical world
  - Multiple ‘layers’ in the networking world
- DNS infrastructure
  - Providing DNSSEC extensions to raise the barrier for DNS based attacks
  - Provides a security barrier or an enhancement for systems and applications

# Example 1: mismatched CN


The screenshot illustrates a security error in Mozilla Firefox. The browser window shows the URL <http://www.robecoadvies.nl/finsebroke>. A "Security Error: Domain Name Mismatch" dialog box is displayed, stating: "You have attempted to establish a connection with 'www.robecoadvies.nl'. However, the security certificate presented belongs to 'www.robecodirect.nl'. It is possible, though unlikely, that someone may be trying to intercept your communication with this web site." The dialog includes a "View Certificate" button and "OK", "Cancel", and "Help" buttons. An arrow points from the "View Certificate" button to the "Certificate Viewer" window.

The "Certificate Viewer: 'www.robecodirect.nl'" window shows the following details:

This certificate has been verified for the following uses:	
SSL Server Certificate	
<b>Issued To</b>	
Common Name (CN)	www.robecodirect.nl
Organization (O)	Robeco
Organizational Unit (OU)	Robeco Direct N.V.
Serial Number	0B:F6:DB:74:C9:1E:1C:B6:52:9B:4E:82:43:EC:86
<b>Issued By</b>	
Common Name (CN)	<Not Part Of Certificate>
Organization (O)	VeriSign Trust Network
Organizational Unit (OU)	VeriSign, Inc.
<b>Validity</b>	
Issued On	6/18/2004
Expires On	6/19/2005
<b>Fingerprints</b>	
SHA1 Fingerprint	39:A7:AB:1C:C3:64:FE:93:75:03:A3:4D:C5:DD:75:81:FE:12:98:46
MD5 Fingerprint	EE:21:4D:E3:B8:4A:EE:21:26:D0:4D:8C:CB:26:A7:87

Arrows indicate the mismatch: one points from the error message to the URL [www.robecoadvies.nl](http://www.robecoadvies.nl), and another points from the "Common Name (CN)" field in the certificate viewer to the URL [www.robecodirect.nl](http://www.robecodirect.nl).

# Example 2: Unknown CA



Unknown Certificate Authority

# Confused?

**Security Alert**

Information you exchange with this site cannot be viewed or changed by others. However, there is a problem with the site's security certificate.

- The security certificate was issued by a company you have not chosen to trust. View the certificate to determine whether you want to trust the certifying authority.

...ate is valid.

...as a valid name matching the name of the page you are trying to view.

**Web Site Certified by an Unknown Authority**

Unable to verify the identity of bert.secret-wg.org as a trusted site.

Possible reasons for this error:

- Your browser does not recognize the Certifying Authority.
- The site's certificate is incomplete due to missing information.
- You are connected to a site pretending to be a trusted site.

Please notify the site's webmaster about the error.

Before accepting this certificate, you should be willing to accept this certificate for the purpose of exchanging confidential information.

Accept this certificate permanently

Accept this certificate temporarily for this session

**Warning - Security**

Do you want to accept the certificate from web site "www.p3.postbank.nl" for the purpose of exchanging encrypted information?

Publisher authenticity verified by: "VeriSign, Inc."

- The security certificate was issued by a company that is not trusted.
- The security certificate has not expired and is still valid.

Caution: "www.p3.postbank.nl" asserts that this content is safe. You should only accept this content if you trust "www.p3.postbank.nl".

**Security Alert**

Information you exchange with this site cannot be viewed or changed by others. However, there is a problem with the site's security certificate.

- The security certificate was issued by a company you have not chosen to trust. View the certificate to determine whether you want to trust the certifying authority.
- The security certificate date is valid.
- The security certificate has a valid name matching the name of the page you are trying to view.

Do you want to proceed?

**Certificate signer not found**

The server's certificate chain is incomplete, and the signer(s) are not registered. Accept?

bert.secret-wg.org

- The certificate for "bert.secret-wg.org" is signed by the unknown Certificate Authority "Secret WG Certificate Authority". It is not possible to verify that this is a valid certificate


# How does DNSSEC come into this picture?

- DNSSEC secures the name to address mapping
  - before the certificates are needed
- DNSSEC provides an “independent” trust path.
  - The person administering “https” is most probably a different person from the one that does “DNSSEC”
  - The chains of trust are most probably different
  - See [acmqueue.org](http://acmqueue.org) article: “Is Hierarchical Public-Key Certification the Next Target for Hackers?”

# DNS resolving


Question: www.ripe.net

A






# DNS Data flow




# DNS Vulnerabilities



# The Problem

- DNS data is too readily changed, removed or replaced between the “server” and the “client”.
- This can happen in multiple places in the DNS architecture
  - Some places are more vulnerable than others
  - Vulnerabilities in DNS software make attacks easier (and software will never stop being at risk)

# Secure DNS Query and Response (simple case)



**Attacker can not forge this answer without the associated private keys.**

# How Does DNSSEC Extend DNS?

- DNSSEC adds four new record types:
  - DNSKEY - carries public key
  - RRSIG - carries signature of DNS information
  - DS - carries a signed hash of key
  - NSEC (NextSECure ) - signs gaps to assure non-existence
- Working on one more, NSEC3
  - “DNSSEC Hashed Authenticated Denial of Existence”. This would provide privacy enhancement.